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Abstract 
This paper examines stock market reactions of affected firms to the introduction of the 
Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, ESTMA. Using publicly available stock return 
data on Canadian listed mining firms and oil and gas producers an event study is employed to 
assess how the stock market reacted to the key events in leading up to the enactment of the Act. 
ESTMA mandates extractive firms listed on Canadian stock exchange to disclose payments 
made to governments regarding exploration of oil, natural gas, and minerals. The evidence 
suggests no systematic negative impact on affected firms’ stock returns surrounding the 
analysed events.   
Keywords: Financial transparency, Mandatory disclosure requirements, Extractive Sector     
Transparency Measures Act 
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1 Introduction 
Corruption is one of today's greatest obstacles to economic development. It slows economic 
growth and undermines the rule of law around the world. The cost of corruption worldwide is 
estimated to be more than five percent of global GDP and bribes alone constitutes over two 
percent of global GDP (International Chamber of Commerce et al., 2008; World Bank, 2017). 
As a response to this development a range of regulatory measures is available where in recent 
years transparency-based legislation focusing on disclosure requirements has been increasingly 
introduced. Since the start of this millennia, this kind of legislation in this specific area has been 
introduced in a number of countries. It started with the section 1502 and 1504 of the Dodd-
Frank Act in the United States in 2010 which was followed up by the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, EITI, which is the most comprehensive initiative intended to combat 
corruption in the extractive industries. It was adopted by the European Parliament in October 
2013. More recently Canada has also introduced its own version of anti-corruption legislation 
through mandatory disclosure requirements for the extractive sector. 
As the effects of disclosure requirements in general have been given little attention and 
mandatory disclosure requirements to specifically combat corruption and bribery is an even 
more novel concept the effects of this kind of legislation on the affected firms have not yet been 
given equal attention as the problem of corruption itself. However, along with a growing 
literature in this field at least one relevant effort has been made addressing the effects of this 
kind of legislation in the extractive sector specifically where Johannesen and Larsen (2016) 
find that transparency-based legislation through mandatory disclosure requirements has 
negative effects on the firm value of firms participating in the EITI.  
Although legislation of this form aims at increasing transparency there are potential negative 
outcomes to deal with if policies and regulation are not carefully prepared to address all aspects. 
Berns (2011) emphasize that as international stock markets are getting more efficient the 
process of delisting involves less inconvenience and argues that the introduction of the 
disclosure requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act could result in US firms delisting as a result of 
increased cost related to the legislation, consisting of both compliance cost and public relations 
costs. Stemming from having to disclose payments made to foreign governments. Berns (2011) 
exemplifies this by noting a number of delistings around the time of the introduction of the 
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legislation. Although the evidence presented by Berns (2011) is anecdotal, the prediction is 
realised in a similar setting as Engel et al. (2006) empirically shows that mandatory disclosure 
legislation in the context of the Sarbanes Oxley Act increased the rate of listed firms going 
private as a measure to avoid costs related to the legislation. 
In the area of disclosure requirements in the extractive sector it would be the extreme case of 
negative outcomes if firms chose to go private as a way of escape the costs associated with 
mandatory disclosure requirements as it would render the legislations ability to combat 
corruption rather weak. Similarly, if affected firms are perceived to be negatively affected by 
this kind of legislation through increased costs they have the option to withdraw from a place 
of business in a resource-rich country with the potential result of being replaced by another 
extractive business that obeys under laxer anti-corruption legislation (Sarfaty, 2013). Thus, the 
effect of the introduced legislation on the implementing country and affected firms are business 
opportunities forgone. Simultaneously the resource-rich country may experience a decline in 
economic development as corruption increases.  
This study seeks to examine the effects on firm value during the introduction of legislation 
aimed at increasing transparency and combat corruption through mandatory disclosure 
requirements for Canadian firms in the extractive sector. Based on a sample of stock returns for 
1226 mining companies and 275 oil and gas producers an event study methodology is used to 
analyse the key regulatory events that led up to the enactment of the Extractive Sector 
Transparency Measures Act, ESTMA. The analysis is conducted with the aim to answer the 
following research question: How did the enactment of the Extractive Sector Transparency 
Measures Act affect the firm value of Canadian listed firms? As previous studies generally do 
not account for heterogonous effects within the extractive sector a further objective of this paper 
is to examine if the firm value of oil and gas producers and mining companies are affected 
differently by the introduction of ESTMA.  
Due to the fact that several of the regulatory changes that have been made in this area have been 
implemented during recent years, the long-term effects are still uncertain. As the regulatory 
environment differs by countries and geographical areas, the implications of introduced 
legislation in the US and the global EITI initiative cannot be generalised to other contexts. 
However, as ESTMA is closely related to the Dodd-Frank Act and the EITI initiative this 
provides an opportunity to take the first step in the examination of the implications of ESTMA 
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on affected firms. Thus, this study contributes to the growing body of literature on the effects 
of policy introduction on firm value by providing the first analysis of mandatory disclosure 
requirements applied to the Canadian extractive sector. Evidence that does not confirm the 
findings in the previous literature on disclosure requirements should raise the question of what 
dissimilarities in policy development different countries could address to collectively minimise 
the negative outcomes of transparency legislation. Evidence in support for previous findings 
provokes equally important questions regarding the design of policy targeted at increasing 
transparency and signals the need for further examination of this specific branch of policy.  
This remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a background to 
transparency-based legislation and ESTMA in particular followed by an overview of the 
literature in the field of mandatory disclosure requirements and its effect on firm value. In 
section 2 the data used, and a detailed description of the event study methodology is presented 
followed by the empirical results in section 3. In section 4 robustness checks are performed and 
the results of which are presented. This is followed by a discussion of the results and the 
limitations to the study. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in section 6. 
1.1 Provisions of ESTMA 
As Canada is home to over 50 percent of the world’s publicly listed mining and exploration 
firms there is much pressure from the global society on Canada to attend to its responsibility to 
not only live up to international anti-corruption standards, but also set an example and lead the 
way (Trade and Development Canada, 2013). Canada also had the advantage of examining the 
introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act which was implemented in the US in 2010. The Cardin-
Lugar amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act includes section 1504 which compel US resource 
extraction issuers to disclose payments made to the US federal government and/or foreign 
governments. The ESTMA is closely related to the section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act but 
there are differences in the application of the law to individual firms. While the US version only 
applies to issuers that are already required to file an annual report in line with compliance with 
the US Securities Exchanges Act the ESTMA is designed to theoretically capture all firms 
within the extractive industries (SEC, 2015; 2016). Another difference comparing ESTMA to 
the Dodd-Frank Act is the rule proposing process.  In the US the Securities and Exchange 
Commission was the regulatory body responsible for developing the rules for the proposal of 
the Cardin Lugar amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Whereas in Canada the group of 
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representatives that developed the rule proposal consisted of both government representatives 
as well as representatives from the industries and civil society organisations.  
 
The ESTMA defines the entities that have to disclose payments as payees, which is 
corporations, trusts or unincorporated organisations that engage in the commercial development 
of oil, gas, and minerals in Canada or somewhere else and are listed on a Canadian stock 
exchange. The activities for which payments have to be disclosed includes Exploration, 
extraction, and acquisition or holding of a permit or similar authorisation to perform the 
extraction of exploration of oil, gas or minerals. The type of payments for these activities 
includes taxes (other than consumption- and income taxes), production entitlements, bonuses, 
infrastructure improvement payments and other considerations for licenses, permits or 
concessions. Finally, the law stipulates that entities have to disclose payments according to 
these definitions to all levels of government, in Canada or a foreign state, including state-owned 
enterprises (Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, 2014). This has significant 
implications for the potential success for the legislation to combat corruption since OECD 
(2014) Foreign Bribery Report reports revealed that officials in state-owned enterprises 
represent over 80 percent of the recipients of bribes in examined bribery cases. The 
consequence for firms when failing to comply with the ESTMA requirements and publish a 
report within 150 days after the end of the fiscal year, or for purposely mislead authorities by 
publishing a misleading report is an offence punishable with a fine of up to CAD$ 250000. 
Furthermore, each day that passes from the submission of the first non-compliant report or from 
the day when a compliant report should have been submitted is considered a separate offence. 
Thus, a firm that neglects to properly report or correct a faulty report for a whole year will have 
to pay a hefty fine (Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, 2014).  
 
1.2 Literature review  
 
It is frequently argued that mandatory disclosure requirements can result in efficient securities 
markets and that it reduces firms’ cost of capital. Despite this, full voluntary disclosure by firms 
is a rare occurrence in reality. The reason is probably the costs associated with disclosing 
information by firms. Except for the direct costs of paying fines associated with not complying, 
the most obvious is the cost of producing the appropriate reports to be able to comply with the 
legislation. Especially since this information often is of such character that before it could be 
properly disclosed it has to be certified by a third party such as an accounting firm. Admati and 
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Pfleiderer (2000) explore whether firms at all should disclose information and how much 
information that should be disclosed and also what this information should consist of to 
determine the optimal disclosure policy. They proceed by outlining 3 assumptions regarding 
the disclosure of information by firms. First, it is assumed that firms' values are correlated which 
implies that disclosed information by one firm will be used by investors to evaluate other firms. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, it is costly to disclose information and these costs increases as 
the precision of the disclosed information increases. Thirdly it is assumed that information 
asymmetries between investors and firms reduce firm value. Conversely, the opposite is also 
true, decreasing information asymmetries will increase firm value. These assumptions are 
examined through a model of initially one firm and later on two firms to decide the optimal 
disclosure policy. It is concluded that there is a potential value in introducing disclosure 
requirements albeit the specific structure for regulation remains to be examined.  
 
These costs are also analysed by Zhang (2007) in a different context through an event study of 
the key events leading up to the passage and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX 
in the US in 2002. The purpose of SOX is to introduce greater penalties for managerial 
misconduct and to prevent deceptive accounting for affected firms. Through the analysis of 
abnormal returns of US stock indices Zhang (2007) hypothesizes that the costs of the 
introduction of legislation might outweigh the benefits. By using a method of constructing a 
control group by estimating an index based on stock returns for firms listed in countries other 
than in the US it is concluded that the introduction of SOX imposes statistically significant 
costs on affected firms by decreasing firm value in association with the analysed events. These 
costs reflect the private costs of complying with the legislation and the expected future cost of 
regulation to come. A further examination of the implications of SOX on firm costs is 
conducted by Engel et al. (2006). They hypothesise that the costs imposed by SOX should 
warrant avoidance strategies by the affected firms, where the specific strategy is going private. 
Engel et al. (2006) examine firms at the public/private margin to establish if the introduction of 
SOX was associated with an increased number of firms that deregistered and went private. 
Together with the results obtained by Berns (2011), this result is highly relevant for the policy 
implications of the ESTMA where delisting, despite being an extreme measure, is a possible 
action that could be used by firms to avoid having to comply with ESTMA in the future.  
 
Gao et al. (2018) also make use of an event study methodology to examine the stock and bond 
market reactions to the events that resulted in the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US in 
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2010. The paper is focused on examining the effects on systematically important firms with the 
aim to investigate if the act is effective in reducing big financial institutions risk-taking and to 
shed light on whether this type of regulation could be employed to help end the bailout policy.  
The first step in this analysis is an event study of the effect on the firms affected by the Dodd-
Frank Act. They use data on 45 financial institutions including the six biggest banks and 
hypothesize that the introduced legislation would be effective in reducing the bailout 
expectation in future financial emergencies through a negative effect on stock returns and a 
positive effect on bond returns during the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act. They conclude 
that the Dodd-Frank act was effective in reducing the financial institutions' risk-taking as bigger 
banks and financial institutions experienced a change in firm value through large negative 
abnormal returns over the observed events. Notable about the study by Gao et al. (2018) is that 
the problematic aspects of small sample sizes proclaimed by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) are 
not addressed. Given a small sample, outliers could have an increased influence on the result.  
 
The number of studies that examines disclosure requirements within the field of extractive 
sector is naturally limited due to the few numbers of legislative initiatives in this area. Due to 
the novelty of ESTMA, the current literature on the implications of this specific legislation is 
yet to be written. Despite this, some efforts have been made to examine the effect of 
transparency-based legislation on a firm's value within the extractive sector in the implementing 
country using similar methods as Zhang (2007), Engel et al. (2006) and Gao et al. (2018). 
 
With the aim to analyse if a regulatory change is affecting the firm value of European extractive 
firms Johannesen and Larsen (2016) focus on the legislative process of the EITI during the 
introduction of legislation designed to increase transparency and to curb tax evasion for Oil, 
gas and mining companies listed on European stock exchanges. Through an event study, the 
authors hypothesize that the introduction of legislation on more stringent rules on tax reporting 
will have negative effects on affected firms’ value. The authors use data on 3642 firms in the 
extractive industries in 13 different countries out of which 1978 are listed on at least one 
European stock exchange which makes them compliant under EITI. The remaining firms are 
used as a control group. They conclude that the introduction of legislation to increase 
transparency in the European extractive sector was associated with negative abnormal returns 
of 5 to 10 percent over the observed events, meaning that the introduction of EITI affected the 
firm value of compliant firms negatively.  Johannesen and Larsen (2016) conclude that this is 
suggestive that transparency can potentially be an effective tool to combat tax evasion in the 
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extractive sector. The conclusions made by Johannesen and Larsen (2016) I argue should be 
interpreted cautiously as the analysis is partly based on average abnormal returns for a sample 
of firms from several different countries. The effect of the introduction of the legislation could 
be expected to differ depending on the country origin of the firms in the control group. For 
example, as the legislation was passed some of the firms in the control group might also have 
experienced negative abnormal returns based on the expectation that similar legislation will in 
the future apply to them as well. Furthermore, it is a difficult task to untangle the part of the 
decline in firm value stemming from expected future costs from the part that originates from 
the actual effectiveness of the legislation.  
 
Seitz (2016) makes use of an event study to examine the stock market reaction of affected firms 
during the introduction of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, KPCS, which is a 
certification process established by the UN General Assembly to prevent conflict diamonds 
entering the mainstream markets. The KPCS bares similarities with the EITI initiative. The 
mechanism through which the Certification Scheme intends to decrease conflict diamonds 
entering the market is based on increased transparency where firms in participating countries 
have to agree to monitor and disclose both internal trade as well as import and export of 
diamonds. Another similarity with EITI is that the KPCS tasks participating countries 
governments with drafting legislation to fulfill the KPCS requirements. Seitz (2016) 
hypothesise that the introduction of this regulation would have negative effects on the firm 
value of mining and jewellery firms. A large sample of firms from nine different countries is 
analysed. It is concluded that mining companies and jewellery companies are affected 
differently where mining companies suffered from negative effects on firm value to a larger 
extent than jewellery as a result of the introduction of the KPCS. Seitz (2016) does not use a 
control group to compare the results for the used sample, however, the analysis is performed 
on two different event window lengths to further asses the analysis’ ability to isolate the events 
of interest. The paper by Seitz (2016) and a part of the analysis in Johannesen and Larsen (2016) 
differ methodologically from this paper in the use of the method of estimating the normal 
performance of the analysed firms' stock returns as the constant mean return model is used. 
This model can be criticised for simplifying the movement of stock returns over time as opposed 
to the market model used in this study. However, in line with Seitz (2016), this study utilises a 
shorter event window as a robustness check.  
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Additionally, based on the assumption that there are no heterogeneous effects within the sector, 
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) treat the whole extractive sector as one while Seitz (2016) treats 
mining and jewellery companies separately. Albeit the logic behind examining the whole 
industry as one is sound as legislation like EITI and ESTMA is targeted at the industry as a 
whole, dividing the sample into subgroups adds a dimension to the analysis. Namely that a 
potential reaction is driven by a specific part of the extractive industry which is of interest both 
for policymakers but also for further research regarding the reasons for potential negative firm 
value effects. 
 
2. Method and data 
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development  
 
The phenomena of corruption will undoubtedly have complex and far-reaching effects. 
However, this kind of regulatory change will have short-term effects on the affected firms' value 
in terms of stock return which can only move in two directions. The concept behind examining 
stock returns as a measure of firm value is based on the fact that the listed firm's value is 
expressed in their stock price. Which in turn reflects the present value of future cash flows and 
costs. Thus, the stock market reaction to a certain event is indicative of the firms' attitude 
towards the expected implications of that event. On one hand is the fact that this kind of 
strengthening of the regulatory environment would be preferable for affected firms. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2000) assert that transparency regulation will allow firms in the extractive industries 
to see how much their competitors are paying for the development of oil and gas or mineral 
products. This should result in that shareholders are given the tools to penalize firms that are 
perceived to not behave in accordance with established norms, with regards to the firm's 
government payments. Under those circumstances, shareholders would enjoy the benefits of a 
higher level of transparency which would also be reflected in the stock returns of affected firms 
during the introduction of ESTMA as a positive reaction. Similarly, the shareholders may have 
incentives to encourage corruption if it is perceived to be beneficial for them, for instance, if 
the expected costs associated with the legislation is outweighed by expected future cash flows 
that would accrue from the company winning a profitable exploration contract through a bribe. 
This could manifest as a positive effect or no reaction at all. The opposite reaction is also 
theoretically predicted by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) and confirmed for transparency-based 
legislation preceding ESTMA where it is shown that the notion of decreased future cash flows 
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due to higher costs associated with imposed legislation outweighed the potential positive effects 
and resulted in negative stock returns for the affected firms associated with the events leading 
up to the passage of mandatory disclosure requirements.  
 
MacKinlay (1997) proposes to sort the events in categories based on the characteristics of the 
event in terms of the expected effect on the firm's stock returns. This approach is suitable in 
cases like the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US which was an object of legal 
challenges from the affected firms which caused the SEC to retract the proposal and rework it 
(Lynch, 2012). The events leading up to the enactment of the ESTMA, even though the affected 
firms opposed the proposed rules through different channels, was not in general object of any 
major action that resulted in an event that would be expected to affect the whole sector in the 
opposite direction. However, there is one exception regarding one particular event. Based on 
this framework and results obtained by previous studies on the effects of disclosure 
requirements on firm value both in general and in the extractive sector the two following 
hypothesis is stated regarding the expected result.  
 
𝐻𝐻1: It is expected that all events are associated with negative stock market returns for both 
mining firms and oil and gas producers. 
 
With the exception of the official release of the ESTMA rules on the 16th of January 2014 for 
which oil and gas producers are expected to show positive returns since the rules presented is 
targeting the mining sector exclusively (Publish What You Pay, 2014). Moreover, regarding 
the potential heterogeneous effects on the two subsamples, a second hypothesis is examined. 
 
𝐻𝐻2: Oil and gas producers and mining companies are expected to experience stock return 
reactions in the same direction for events that should affect the subsectors similarly.  
 
 
2.2 Data  
 
The stock price data and stock index data are collected using Thompson Reuters Datastream 
and consists of daily stock prices for all listed mining and oil and gas producers on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange, TSX and TXS Ventures. The stock indices used in the TSX Composite.  The 
data is comprised to pooled time series where stock prices are transformed into return data for 
each stock and index according to 
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𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1   (1) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1is the price of stock i at day t and day t-1 respectively and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the return 
of stock i. The procedure is identical for the index. The included events are selected from the 
legislative history of the ESTMA and thorough examination of the news coverage of the 
ESTMA in large newspapers. The data initially consists of 1226 Canadian mining firms and 
275 firms from the Oil & Gas industry. Furthermore, from the sample firms that trade thinly, 
i.e. stocks with a non-positive daily trading volume which results in no return data, is excluded. 
This is done since thinly traded stocks are more likely to show a higher occurrence of zero and 
high non-zero returns which will bias the variance estimates for the cumulative abnormal 
returns estimates (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996). Dates which includes the release of firms’ 
earnings announcements are manually cross-referenced with the event windows for each event. 
Firms which release earnings announcements during the event windows are excluded since it 
would bias the abnormal return estimates by affecting the returns in the event window. For each 
event firms that do not have return data for the full estimation and event window is excluded to 
guarantee equal weights of observations for each of the events. The final sample consists of 
1050 to 1060 mining firms and 225 to 233 oil and gas producers depending on the event. The 
final sample is limited to listed Canadian firms, smaller firms that are not listed is even though 
they are affected by ESTMA is not taken into account as it would require other measures of 
firm value which entails difficulties with regard to data availability. The sample size is a 
potential issue in event studies as small sample allows outliers in the data to have increased 
influence on the results. To further examine this the distribution of the cumulative abnormal 
returns is plotted to assess the distributional properties and occurrence of outliers, this is mainly 
expected to be an issue for the sample of oil and gas producers which is the smaller sample. 
The results are presented in appendix B (Figures 2 and 3). The plots show some noticeable 
outliers for the sample of oil and gas producers. However, for the main result outliers are 
disregarded as all data points contain information that will be missing if observations are 
deleted.  
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2.3 Identifying assumptions 
A crucial assumption regarding the event study method and also the main theoretical foundation 
is the efficient market hypothesis, EMH, as expressed by Fama (1970) in his famous survey 
paper. The EMH stipulates that all information available to the market is reflected in the stock 
prices. Understanding the sufficient conditions for market efficiency is straightforward. The 
requirements are no transaction costs when trading stocks, that all available information is 
costless available to all market participants and that said participants agree on the implications 
of the information for the prices and distributions of future prices for the stocks. In theory, the 
EMH can be categorized into three levels: The weak-Form implies that the market is efficient, 
reflecting all market information and that market return rates are independent.  The Semi-strong 
form assumes efficient markets which reflects all market information, publicly available 
information and that the market quickly absorbs news. Given this form, it would be theoretically 
impossible for an investor to benefit from trading on the new information when it arrives. 
Lastly, the strong-form incorporates the two previous forms and reflects all information, 
market, public and private. This implies that an investor would not be able to benefit from 
trading on new information even if she was given the information privately. As easy as it is to 
understand the sufficient conditions it is to see that the market described above is not a 
representative illustration of modern financial markets. The modern stock market is 
characterised by the semi-strong form which enables the event study method to work. In the 
case of the weak-form, it would be impossible to conduct an event study since there would be 
no stock market reaction to news. Conversely, under the strong-form, the new information 
would already be reflected in the price of the stock and the event would cause no reaction. 
Based on extensive testing of the different forms Fama (1970) concludes that there is no 
important evidence against the weak and semi-strong versions and only limited evidence 
against the strong form. Thus, the assumption that the modern stock market is characterised by 
the semi-strong form of the EMH constitutes the basis for the use of the event study 
methodology. 
2.4 Event history 
An important assumption regarding the choice of event is the assumed to be exogenous 
Campbell et al. (1998). An exogenous event implies that the returns do not influence the 
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occurrence of the event. In the case of regulatory events, returns of the sample firms are 
assumed to not affect whether or not any of the events occur. 
 
The time period of interest ranges from the first event on June 12, 2013, when former Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly announces that the Canadian government would take 
increased action against corruption by requiring extractive firms to disclose payments made to 
governments (CBS, 2013). The next event is the formal signing of the 2013 Lough Erne G8 
Summit declaration on transparency in the extractive sector on the 18th of June 2013 (BBC, 
2013). These two initial events are important based on their symbolic value. Political events of 
this type are suitable candidates as political news is known to affect stock markets to different 
degrees. The announcement of regulatory changes in this context was also shown by Gao et al. 
(2018) to be associated with negative effects on firm value. The next event occurs on the 14th 
of June 2014 when the Resource Revenue Transparency Working Group, RRTWG, officially 
presents the rules that will lay the foundation for the recommendations on mandatory disclosure 
of payments of extractive firms to governments (Publish What You Pay Canada, 2014). Rule 
announcements are commonly used in policy event studies as the information released gives 
affected firms a first view of the final form of the legislation. In this case the event carries extra 
weight since at this stage the ESTMA only applied to mining companies.  
 
Furthermore, event dates that are derived from the legislative process of the ESTMA are 
included, starting with the date when the proposed rule is tabled in the Canadian parliament for 
the first time on the 23rd of October 2014 (House of Commons of Canada, 2014a). These types 
of events are useful candidates in the analysis since an action has occurred, in this case 
parliament voted on the passing of the rule and the outcome of a vote is not intended to be 
known by the public beforehand (Carroll & Lamdin, 1993). The most important event of the 
legislative history of the act is the final reading in parliament, which is also a vote. This took 
place on the 16th of December 2014 (House of Commons of Canada, 2014b). The third reading 
of the proposal in parliament is the last stage where the proposal can be struck down, after 
passing the third vote the legislation is only a formality away from being enacted as law. This 
formality being the royal assent which is a ceremony where the Governor General grants the 
bill royal assent. This means that the bill is officially passed as Canadian law. ESTMA received 
royal assent on the 14th of December 2014 (House of Commons of Canada, 2014c), this date is 
excluded since after passing the third reading and vote there is virtually no uncertainty that the 
proposal will not become law. The actual implementation of ESTMA took place on June 1, 
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2015. The date is not included in the analysis as it was predetermined to occur at that date and 
therefore made it highly anticipated by the market. The included dates are presented in table 1.  
 
Table 1. List of included events  
Event Date 
Prime Minister announces increased action against 
corruption 
 
12 Jun 2013 
The official signing of G8 Lough Ern declaration  
 
18 Jun 2013 
The official release of the ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
16 Jan 2014 
 
The first reading of the ESTMA in parliament 
 
23 Oct 2014 
ESTMA passes final vote in parliament 10 Dec 2014 
 
 
2.5 Event study methodology 
 
The traditional event study methodology is nothing new; it has generally been used extensively 
within the fields of economics, and specifically in finance. The method is preferable when 
examining the short-run impacts of a certain event, or a series of events on firm value. The 
long-term impacts of any specific event are undoubtedly far more complex and require more 
data over an extended period of time to measure different aspects of the analysed events 
(MacKinlay, 1997). An event study draws its advantages from the fact that in the very short 
term, i.e. the moment when the event occurs, the effect would be reflected in the stock price of 
the firms. Over a longer period this effect will be outweighed by other factors that affect stock 
prices but conditional on correct specified event dates, the stock price reaction is interpreted as 
the present value of future cost related to the introduction of the legislation.  
 
An event is defined as an unanticipated event where new information is presented to the market. 
It follows that if the information is expected the result will be the same as assuming the strong-
form of EMH which will make it impossible to assess the effect of an event on stock returns. 
An event window is defined as a period of days during which the impact of the event on the 
stock return will be observed. The next step is to determine the length of the event window. 
This is generally done in one of two ways. On one hand, a fixed event window for all events is 
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used. This method is preferred when a large number of firms are to be analysed. On the other 
hand, individual event window lengths could be used for each stock. The latter is preferable if 
it is suspected that different stocks react to the news with different speed, this method is 
however traditionally less used in the economics literature (Lev, 1989). As the first method is 
more appropriable with large data samples, a fixed event window is used.  
 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) propose that the likelihood of information leakage should 
determine how early before the event the event window should start. The likelihood of leakage 
is also higher in event studies examining regulatory changes as compared to the analysis of 
mergers and acquisitions which is also typically examined in event studies. In light of this, this 
study will make use of a five-day event window for each observed event where the day of the 
event is day 0 and the window will cover day -2 to +2. This allows the event window to capture 
the effect of information leakage by at most two days and also capture the effect of information 
that got released to the stock market after closing time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next step in the procedure is to construct the counterfactual level of returns. I.e. what returns 
each stock would yield had the event not occurred, referred to as the stocks’ normal 
performance. This can be done in several ways where the simplest method is the constant mean 
return model used by Seitz (2016) which uses the mean return of each stock in the estimation 
window as the estimate of normal performance. This method tends to oversimplify the 
relationship between stock returns in different time periods. Preferable over the constant mean 
return model is the market model, which relates the returns of each stock to the market returns 
through OLS estimation. Except for the two above mentioned models, the event study literature 
presents a number of more advanced models to estimate the normal performance of analysed 
stocks. The most popular being variations of multiple factor models and the CAPM. However, 
MacKinlay (1997) concludes that more sophisticated methods offer little benefit compared to 
the market model.  
Estimation window                        Event window 
T-130   T-10  T-2           T=0           T+2 
Figure 1. Event study timeline 
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The following steps are presented to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns during the event 
window according to the market model. The rate of return for each firm is estimated according 
to 
 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
                                                        𝐸𝐸(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0),         𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2  
 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the rate of return of firm i on day t, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the rate of return on a market portfolio 
of stocks on day t. A broad market index is preferred to estimate the normal performance, thus 
TSX composite index is used which is the principal broad Canadian stock index. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the 
intercept and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the systematic risk of stock i, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. With the parameter 
estimates from the market model, the abnormal returns of a single stock can be estimated by 
rearranging (2) into 
 
 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (3) 
 
Where 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the abnormal return of stock i at day t, 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖 are the OLS parameter estimates 
which are derived from the regression of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 on 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 in the estimation window. It is important 
for the event window and estimation window not to overlap. This assures that the estimates 
from the OLS estimation are not influenced by the returns in the event window. As suggested 
by MacKinlay (1997) a 120-day estimation window is used. Starting 130 days before the event 
window and ends 10 days before.  
 
The abnormal returns for firm i during the time of the event is the actual returns for firm i in 
the event window less the expected return for firm i in the event window estimated from the 
estimation window. Since an event study observes data across stocks and over more than one 
day the abnormal returns for each stock has to be aggregated. By aggregating each stock's 
abnormal returns over days in the event window the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for 
the stock is calculated as 
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𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2) = �𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
𝑖𝑖=𝑖𝑖1
 (4) 
Where the period between t1 and t2 is the event window. By taking the sum of the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns for all stocks and divide by the total number of stocks the estimated average 
cumulative abnormal returns for all stocks in the event window is calculated.  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅������(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2) = 1𝑁𝑁�𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2)𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 (5) 
The variance of the cumulative abnormal returns across the sample for the event window is 
calculated as 
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2)) = 1𝑁𝑁 − 1�(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅������)2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 (6) 
As positive and negative reactions should offset each other on average across firms the final 
step is to test the null hypothesis that the average cumulative abnormal returns are equal to zero 
during the event window surrounding each event. The significance test of the average 
cumulative abnormal return is conducted using the test statistic  
𝜃𝜃 = √𝑁𝑁 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅������(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2)
�𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2)) (7) 
If the test result is significant the average cumulative abnormal returns are statistically different 
from zero and the event is interpreted to have a significant effect on stock returns as the stock 
price has been revaluated as a result of the event.  
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3 Results 
 
In this section the main results are presented in table 2 and 3 followed by the result from a 
sensitivity analysis performed by reproducing the main analysis with outlier robust regression 
for estimation of normal performance (table 4 and 5). Table 6 and 7 present the results from 
further robustness checks using a shorter event window. All results are presented 
chronologically event by event. For descriptive statistics for cumulative abnormal returns for 
each event and subsector see appendix 2. 
 
Table 2. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for oil and gas producers  
Event date Event 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪������ 
  N 5-day 
12 Jun 2013 Prime Minister announces increased 
action corruption  
227 -0.006 
(0.655) 
 
  
18 Jun 2013 The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
Declaration 
227 -0.005 
(0.695) 
 
  
16 Jan 2014 The official release of the ESTMA 
regulatory framework  
166 -0.008 
(0.563) 
 
  
23 Oct 2014 The first reading of ESTMA in 
parliament 
232 0.026** 
(0.045) 
 
  
10 Dec 2014 ESTMA passes final vote parliament 232 -0.045*** 
(0.005)    
Note: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normal performance estimated with TSX 
Composite index.  
 
By observing table 2 it is apparent all events except for the first reading in parliament is 
associated with negative abnormal returns. The first two events both show negative abnormal 
returns of 0.6 and 0.5 percent respectively, however, the null hypothesis that the abnormal 
return is statistically different from zero cannot be rejected for any of the two events. The third 
event, the release of the rules, is associated with average abnormal returns of negative 0.8 
percent over the event window. The first reading of ESTMA in parliament over the 5-day event 
window is associated with a positive average abnormal return of 2.6 percent which is 
statistically significant on the 5 percent level while the final reading and vote of the legislation 
on the 10th of December 2014 is associated with negative average abnormal returns of 4.5 
percent. For this event, the null hypothesis that the average abnormal return is 0 can be rejected 
at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3.  Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for mining firms   
Event date Event 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪������ 
  N 5-day 
12 Jun 2013 Prime Minister announces increased 
action against corruption 
1057 -0.003 
(0.689) 
 
  
18 Jun 2013 The official signing of G8 Lough 
Ern Declaration 
1050 -0.007 
(0.396) 
 
  
16 Jan 2014 The official release of ESTMA 
regulatory framework 
1063 0.078*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
23 Oct 2014 The first reading of ESTMA in 
parliament 
1056 -0.010 
(0.366) 
 
  
10 Dec 2014 ESTMA passes final vote in 
parliament 
1067 -0.002 
(0.787) 
Note: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normal performance estimated with TSX 
Composite index.  
 
Turning to baseline results of mining firms in table 3, the two initial events were associated 
with negative abnormal returns of 0.3 and 0.7 percent respectively. As in the sample of oil and 
gas producers, none of these two events is proven to be significantly different from zero. The 
first event for which the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns over the 5-day event window 
are equal to zero could be rejected is the official release of the ESTMA rules on 16 January 
2014 which is associated with positive abnormal returns of 7.8 percent, which is statistically 
significant on the one percent level. The first reading of the proposal in parliament did show 
negative abnormal returns of 1 percent, however, it is not significantly different from zero. The 
event on 10 December 2014, when the final vote took place was over the 5-day event window 
is associated with a non-significant abnormal return of negative 0.2 percent.  
 
4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
4.1 Outlier robust estimation of normal performance 
 
A common problematic aspect of regression analysis is that inference drawn from OLS 
regression is sensitive to outliers.  Estimated normal performance of the stocks could therefore 
potentially rely on outliers in the return data for the stock. These outliers could be the result of 
confounding events that are not controlled for with the event study method (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997). Throughout the event study literature outliers are typically handled in one of 
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three ways; ignoring them, arbitrarily decide at which cut-off an observation is regarded as an 
outlier and then delete them from the sample or winsorizing either the largest or the smallest 
values which is a method of replacing them with other values which are also arbitrarily chosen 
(Sorokina et al. 2013). The first method is also what is used for the main results of this paper. 
Simply deleting extremely high or low abnormal returns from the sample may improve the 
accuracy of the results. However, all data points represent information, which will be lost if 
observations are deleted. Despite this, if outliers are ignored it could result in the estimated 
normal performance being possibly tilted towards outliers which means that the estimated 
normal performance could be heavily based on these outliers. This could have implications for 
the result as the effect of the event might not be observed if the normal performance is skewed. 
As a robustness check to see whether the effect of the events regarding the introduction of the 
ESTMA on affected firms’ stock returns is skewed to depend on outliers in the data, the analysis 
is performed using a regression method more robust to outliers than traditional OLS. As 
proposed by Sorokina et al. (2013) Huber weighted regression is used to estimate normal 
performance. The M-Estimator developed by Huber (1973) assigns lower weights to the outliers 
in the data, reducing the influence of outliers on the fitted regression line1. This allows for 
information to be kept in the data while at the same time decreasing the influence of outliers 
that might skew the result.   
1 For a more detailed description of the weighted regression method the reader is referred to the original paper 
by Huber (1973).   
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Table 4. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for oil and gas producers 
Event date Event 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪������ 
N 5-day
12 Jun 2013 Prime Minister announces increased 
action against corruption 
227 0.017 
(0.289) 
18 Jun 2013 The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
Declaration 
227 0.017 
(0.103) 
16 Jan 2014 The official release of ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
225 0.023 
(0.147) 
23 Oct 2014 The first reading of ESTMA in 
parliament 
232 -0.015
(0.150)
16 Dec 2014 ESTMA passes final vote in parliament 225 0.042*** 
(0.000) 
Note: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normal performance estimated with TSX 
Composite index. Huber weighted regression used to estimate normal performance.  
Table 4 shows the average abnormal returns for oil and gas producers over the 5-day event 
window where Huber weighted regression and the TSX composite stock index was used to 
estimate normal performance. As can be seen, all events were associated with positive abnormal 
returns except for the first reading of the proposal in parliament. The first two events where 
both associated with abnormal returns of 1.7 percent while the official rule release was 
associated with abnormal returns of 2.3 percent. The first reading which was the only event 
associated with negative abnormal returns for oil and gas producers showed abnormal returns 
of negative 1.5 percent. Moreover, oil and gas producers experienced abnormal returns of on 
average 4.2 percent associated with the final vote in parliament, this is the only event for which 
the null hypothesis could be rejected at any level.  
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Table 5. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for mining companies  
Event date Event 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪������ 
N 5-day
12 Jun 2013 Prime Minister announces increased 
action against corruption  
1057 0.011* 
(0.076) 
18 Jun 2013 The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
Declaration 
1050 0.001 
(0.853) 
16 Jan 2014 The official release of ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
1063 0.113*** 
(0.000) 
23 Oct 2014 The first reading of ESTMA in 
parliament 
1056 0.018* 
(0.078) 
10 Dec 2014 ESTMA passes the final vote in 
parliament 
1059 0.009 
(0.276) 
Note: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normal performance estimated with TSX 
Composite index. Huber weighted regression used to estimate normal performance.  
From table 5 it can be seen that all events are associated with positive abnormal returns for 
mining firms, where the announcement made by former Prime Minister Stephen Harper was 
associated with statically significant abnormal returns of 1.1 percent. The signing of the G8 
declaration was associated with abnormal returns of 0.1 percent; for this event, the null 
hypothesis that the abnormal return is 0 could not be rejected. The days surrounding the official 
release of the ESTMA rules on 16 January 2014 was associated with statistically significant 
abnormal returns of 11.3 percent. The subsequent event, the first reading in parliament was 
associated with positive abnormal returns of 1.8 percent. During the days surrounding the last 
vote, mining firms experienced abnormal returns of 0.9 percent; which was not statistically 
significant. 
4.1 3-day event window 
Following Seitz (2016) the analysis is also conducted using a 3-day event window. A 3-day 
window is the smallest window that can be used to capture potential leakage of information to 
the market. Additionally, the event window needs to cover a minimum of one day following 
the event day to be able to capture the effects of unanticipated information that is released after 
the stock markets have closed. This implies that a longer event window will theoretically give 
a better opportunity to capture any effects of the event while simultaneously increasing the 
difficulty of isolating the effect of the event. The 3-day window is used as an additional 
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robustness check as differences in abnormal returns between different event window lengths 
could indicate the presence of confounding event that could drive the result.  
 
Table 6. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for oil and gas producers. 3-day event window 
Event date Event  𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪������  
  N 3-day 
12 Jun 2013 Prime Minister announces increased 
action against corruption  
227 -0.004 
(0.731)   
      
18 Jun 2013 The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
Declaration 
227 -0.007 
(0.050) 
 
  
16 Jan 2014 The official release of ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
225 -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 
  
23 Oct 2014 The first reading of ESTMA in 
parliament 
232 0.026** 
(0.039) 
 
  
10 Dec 2014 ESTMA passes final vote in parliament 225 -0.032 
(0.157)  
Note: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normal performance estimated with TSX 
Composite index.  
 
 
Over the 3-day event window surrounding the first event oil and gas producers’ experienced 
negative abnormal returns of negative 0.4 percent. The second event, the official signing of the 
G8 declaration was associated with abnormal returns of negative 0.7 percent. None of the two 
first events yielded statistically significant results. The official release of the ESTMA rules on 
the 16th of January 2014 was associated with statistically significant negative abnormal returns 
of 2.0 percent while the following event, the first reading of the proposal in parliament was 
associated with positive abnormal returns of 2.6 percent, statistically significant on the five 
percent level. When the proposal passed the last vote in parliament oil and gas producers’ 
experienced negative abnormal returns of 3.2 percent, however not statistically significant.  
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Table 7. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for mining companies. 3-day event window 
Event date Event  𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪������  
  N 3-day 
12 Jun 2013 Prime Minister announces increased 
action against corruption  
1057 -0.007 
(0.178   
      
18 Jun 2013 The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
Declaration 
1050 -0.023*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
16 Jan 2014 The official release of ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
1063 0.067*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
23 Oct 2014 The first reading of ESTMA in 
parliament 
1056 -0.008 
(0.375) 
 
  
10 Dec 2014 ESTMA passes final vote in parliament 1067 -0.016 
(0.002)  
Note: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normal performance estimated with TSX 
Composite index.  
 
Regarding the mining companies the announcement made by the former prime minister 
demanding action against corruption was associated with negative abnormal returns of 0.7 for 
which the null that the abnormal returns are statistically significantly different from zero could 
not be rejected. The signing of the G8 declaration was associated with negative abnormal 
returns of 2.3 percent, this is statistically significant at the one percent level. The official release 
of the rules is statistically significant on the same level as the previous event. The three days 
surrounding the event is associated with positive abnormal returns of 6.7 percent. For the two 
parliamentary votes, the null that the abnormal returns surrounding these events are different 
from zero could not be rejected. The abnormal returns are negative 0.8 and negative 1.6 percent 
for the first and second vote respectively.   
 
5 Discussion  
 
5.1 Results  
 
Studying the results above it is evident that the events leading up to the enactment of ESTMA 
did affect the two included subsectors differently. Turning to the subsector of oil and gas 
producers and the first and second analysed events, there is no significant effect on firm value. 
How the stock market reacts to regulatory events is dependent on both the expected costs and 
benefits of the legislation and how the firms perceive the likelihood of the legislation to become 
permanent. The result, or lack thereof, surrounding these two first events is indicative that 
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investors might not attach that much value to this kind of symbolic events. This is not surprising 
given that the market, investors and all people historically have learned to account for the 
discrepancies between what politicians say and what they later do. For mining companies, the 
result of the first and second event tends to be contradictive as the first event was associated 
with a weak positive effect when controlling for outliers but the effect while the second event 
is weakly negative over a shorter event window. However, none of the events show results 
robust across different event window length or methods of estimating normal performance. 
Indicating that there might be both confounding events present and that the result is sensitive 
to outliers. 
 
For the next event, the official release of the ESTMA rules on 16 January 2014, oil and gas 
producers were expected to show positive results given that the presented rule was targeting 
mining firms exclusively. The result goes against the hypothesis over the 3-day window. This 
is most likely due to the expectations of the market regarding the oil and gas producers. Even 
though the subsector was not included in the released proposal they might still have been 
expected to be part of the legislation in the future which could explain the negative reaction. 
However, as the effect surrounding that event is not robust to differences in the event window 
size and the influence of outliers the result could be driven by confounding events. For mining 
firms, however, the result is positive and robust for outliers and changes in event window 
length. This is surprising given that mining corporations were hypothesized to show negative 
abnormal return. The same surprising result but not robust to outliers in the data is the market 
reaction for oil and gas producers surrounding the first vote in parliament which was expected 
to be associated with negative abnormal returns as the proposal that was tabled in parliament 
included mining firms and oil and gas producers alike. 
 
These two instances represent the only events where the result proved to be mainly statistically 
significant and robust to different specifications while simultaneously being opposite to the 
hypothesis. A possible explanation for these results is related to what Seitz (2016) asserts 
regarding the introduction of the conflict mineral rules of the KPCS. He argues that as the 
legislation is introduced it creates a barrier to market entry for new firms as the costs of 
operating in the extractive sector now is higher. This is plausible since it could be perceived by 
established firms as positive from a competitive perspective. This assumes that the 
aforementioned positive effect of the legislation outweighs the negative aspects of the increased 
costs and the reason for that could be many. A plausible explanation is the alternative hypothesis 
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noted by Zhang (2007) that investors expected the rules to be stronger than they turned out to 
be, resulting in positive abnormal returns as the information of the actual level of stringency hit 
the market. Another possible explanation is that the firms valued the positive aspects of 
transparency legislation higher than the negative aspects stemming from increased costs. 
Higher transparency support trust between firms and their shareholders, when investors get 
access to more information about the firms the market value of the firms should be closer to the 
true value. Which is also expected to increase firm value. Regarding the first parliamentary 
vote, the result for mining companies is weakly positive but lower in magnitude than the first 
vote, this is to be expected as the probability that the proposed legislation would be struck down 
should be diminishing as the events pass. This event is however not robust to changes in the 
event window length which indicates that something other than the specified event drove the 
market reaction.  
 
For oil and gas producers the uncertainty about the potential implementation of the legislation 
remained, which is confirmed by the significant negative abnormal returns surrounding the last 
event where the ESTMA passed the final vote in parliament. During the introduction of 
transparency legislation, the finalization of the legislative process is often associated with 
negative abnormal returns for affected firms. This is, of course, to be expected. Until that event 
finally confirms the existence of the law, there will always be a probability that the proposal 
will be struck down at some point during the process. However, the abnormal returns shift sign 
and equally significant but positive of similar magnitude as outliers are accounted for. This 
represents an example of when the problem of outliers is imminent. The result should be 
interpreted with caution as the true effect cannot be untangled without closer examination of 
these outliers. Also, as the shorter event window did not capture any significant effect of the 
event the reaction is probably driven by a confounding event two days prior or two days after 
the event date. 
                                                          
Across all events, the only one associated with significant abnormal returns across both 
different event window lengths and robust to outliers is the official release of the ESTMA rules 
for mining companies. This is also the only event where the economic significance is worth 
mentioning, ranging from 6.7 to 11.3 percent for mining companies. Also, the first 
parliamentary vote was associated with fairly robust positive abnormal returns for oil and gas 
producers. The overall result from this analysis is that the introduction of ESTMA was not 
associated with negative stock return reactions.  This goes against both what was hypothesized 
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and what previous results obtained from analyses of the introduction of similar legislation. 
Comparing this to the results obtained by Gao et al. (2018), the most plausible explanation I 
argue stems from the composition of the Resource Revenue Transparency Working Group. 
Which guaranteed that affected firms had greater influence of the content of the legislation 
compared to the Dodd-Frank Act in the US. This is also supported by the lawsuits filed by the 
American Petroleum Institute against the SEC during the rule designing process of the Dodd-
Frank Act (Lynch, 2012). However, as the paper by Gao et al. (2018) includes firms from other 
industries as well the effect found could be driven by other industry sectors. The same 
conclusion is not applicable to the same extent comparing this study with the results obtained 
by Johannesen and Larsen (2011) and Seitz (2016) as compliance with EITI and the KPCS 
requires each member state to put together a working group much like the RRTWG in Canada. 
A possible explanation for the different result compared to the latter studies could be related to 
lobbying activities. The degree of lobbying is unobserved in this study but could be an 
underlying reason contributing to the positive reactions to the Canadian extractive sector to the 
Introduction of ESTMA. Moreover, the lack of negative effects found resulting in not being 
able to confirm the hypothesis that firms would be affected negatively could be related to the 
same critique initially directed to the paper by Johannesen and Larsen (2011). The fact that 
Canada had the opportunity to observe the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and 
the EITI Initiative could have brought about the expectation that similar legislation would come 
to apply for Canadian firms as well which could have made the market effect occur before the 
analysed period.  
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, since the rule release which was the only event associated 
with an actual effect on any subsector was expected to affect the two firm categories in opposite 
direction, the second hypothesis that both subsectors should be affected similarly could only be 
confirmed in terms of the absence of a systematic effect. This result is, however, more likely 
due to the anticipation of the news rather than subsector specific characteristics of the firms. 
Thus, this lends support to methodological choice to not divide the sample of the extractive 
sector into smaller subsectors common in previous studies (Johannesen and Larsen, 2016; Gao 
et al., 2018; Zhang, 2007).  
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5.2 Limitations  
 
For future research, it is important to comment on some limitations of this study. From a 
methodological perspective the most important one is the occurrence of serial correlation. 
Meaning that the abnormal return of stock i at day t is correlated with the abnormal return at 
day t-1. With pooled cross-sectional time series data, the cross-sectional test statistic used in 
this study does not account for the serial correlation of the cumulative abnormal returns of the 
firms over time (Bernard, 1987). The most important implication of serial correlation for the 
event study method is inflated t-values which results in possibly finding significant results when 
there would be none if serial correlation had been accounted for. To mitigate serial correlation 
a more sophisticated statistical test is required. For future researchers conducting event studies 
like this one, I suggest consideration of the adjusted standardized cross-section test developed 
by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) which accounts for serial correlation. Furthermore, the test 
statistic in any event study is based on the normality assumption coupled with a large sample 
size. This implies that the cumulative abnormal returns converge to normality as the sample 
size increases, which makes the test statistic normally distributed under the null hypothesis that 
the average cumulative abnormal returns are equal to 0 (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Brown 
and Warner, 1985). However, by closer examination of the distributional plots in Appendix B 
it can be seen that the distribution of the cumulative abnormal returns are only approximately 
normally distributed with excessive kurtosis. As this is not a methodological paper it is not 
concerned with quantifying the deviation from the normality assumption used for the statistical 
test. However, to add further robustness, future researchers could make use of a non-parametric 
rank test as the one developed by Corrado (1989) which accounts for data that is not normally 
distributed to assess what effect the deviation from normality has on the results2.  
 
Another documented weakness of this event study methodology is the absence of a formal 
control group. The problem is by construction circumvented by the estimation of the normal 
performance of the sample stocks which theoretically works as the control group. The 
problematic aspect of the approach is that the broad stock index used to estimate normal 
performance include firms that are not affected by the legislation since some firms included in 
the index belongs to different industries and are affected differently by economic news and 
                                                 
2. For a more recent discussion on non-parametric test methods in event studies see Kolari and Pynnönen (2011).   
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events that shape the normal performance. Additionally, some of the sample stocks are included 
in the broad index. This results in that the broad index used is a less than perfect proxy for the 
counterfactual price movements of the stocks, which might bias the estimated normal 
performance. Any event study would benefit greatly from finding a control group that is not 
affected by the treatment and comparable to the analysed firms since it makes it possible to 
estimate the normal performance of the sample firms based on other firms with same 
characteristics (Leuz, 2007). However, as pointed out by Leuz (2007), finding a suitable control 
group from a different regulatory environment is a difficult task as the control group has to be 
comparable to the analysed firms in terms of firm characteristics while at the same time be 
affected in the same way by news that affects stock prices. A potential resolution in the 
particular case of the introduction of ESTMA for future researchers to evaluate is the use of US 
extractive firms as a control group. As Zhang (2007) notes, the correlation between Canadian 
and US stock indices are high, indicating that firms from these two countries are affected 
similarly by news. This would theoretically make US extractive firms a uniquely suitable 
control group to compare the result from this study with.  
 
For the purpose of examining the short-term effects of specific events on the firm value, the 
economic literature on the effects of disclosure requirements does not present a great many 
options. However, as explored by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) and performed by Zhang 
(2007) as an extension of her analysis the next step in the examination of event effects is to 
investigate the explanatory factors behind the firms’ cumulative abnormal returns. This is 
traditionally done by estimation of a regression model with explanatory variables on the 
cumulative abnormal returns. In the case of transparency legislation in the extractive industry, 
possible independent variables could be variables indicating where in the world the firms do 
business and the level of corruption in those places. Additionally, firm-specific indicators of 
size and financial performance would be included as well as control variables for other costs 
the firms meet.  
 
As this study analyses the effect of legislation specific to Canada it leaves little room for 
extrapolation of the results. Thus, it confirms the contribution of providing additional analyses 
as these kinds of legislation is introduced in different regulatory environments. An event study 
aims at showing the presence of a correlation between a firm’s value and the occurrence of a 
specific event, which is done through the analysis of the firm’s abnormal returns surrounding 
the event. Nevertheless, as it is theoretically impossible to account for every event other than 
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those analysed that could have an effect on stock prices it is difficult to conclude causality. For 
future studies, a procedure to mitigate the potential bias caused by confounding events is to 
conduct an ex-post analysis of news events in the examined event windows. This is performed 
by Zhang (2007) which allows her to distinguish some confounding events which makes it 
possible to further isolate the effect of the analysed events. In addition to that, this study does 
not attempt to quantify the impact on firm value and does not account for heterogeneous effects 
due to firm characteristics. It is reasonable to assume that the costs associated with this ESTMA 
for some of the world’s biggest mining corporations differs considerably compared to one of 
the smaller oil and gas producers in the sample, and vice versa. This has been proven to be an 
issue in previous studies where for example Johannesen and Larsen (2016) emphasizes that the 
average compliance cost for EITI was $US 0.3 million based on data from the United Kingdom 
while studies regarding SOX derives cost of up to $US2.3 million to comply with this 
legislation together with the assertion that that number grows with every new study (Carney, 
2016). This speaks to the difficulty of determining the exact cost of compliance with 
transparency legislation and distinguish it from the effect that is due to the effectiveness of the 
legislation. This is a yet unexplored field of policy implications for future researchers to 
examine more closely.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to examine if the introduction of transparency based anti-corruption 
legislation in terms of the Canadian ESTMA was associated with abnormal returns for affected 
firms to answer the question whether this process had a negative effect on firm value. This was 
done through an event study where the key events leading up to the enactment of the ESTMA 
was analysed based on stock return data from Canadian listed oil and gas producers and mining 
companies respectively. The evidence shows that only one out of the events leading up to the 
enactment of the ESTMA are associated with statistically significant and robust abnormal 
returns for mining companies, this was the official release of the ESTMA framework which 
showed positive abnormal returns ranging from 6.7 to 11.3 percent. For oil and gas producers 
the result is less compelling even though one event, the first reading of ESTMA in parliament 
is relatively robust and showing positive abnormal returns of around 2.6 percent. Compared to 
the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and more importantly the Global EITI initiative the introduction 
of ESTMA is not associated with systematic negative effects on firm value for Canadian 
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extractive firms. On the contrary, the evidence of this study shows weak support for an overall 
positive effect on firm value surrounding the analysed events. The positive result should be 
interpreted cautiously as the effect is not consistent over all events. From a policy point of view, 
the lack of systematic robust negative effects on firm value surrounding the events is important 
evidence for future policy development in the field of transparency-based legislation through 
mandatory disclosure requirements. 
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8. Appendices  
 
8.1 Appendix A. Descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of CAR over 5-day event window  
Event Median Standard deviation Min, max 
 Oil & gas Mining Oil & gas Mining Oil & gas Mining 
Stephen Harper announces increased 
action against corruption 
 
-0.0021 -0.00299 0.1907 0.2075 -0.6966,   
1.2761 
-1.9283,   
1.5951 
Public signing of G8 Lough Ern 
declaration 
 
-0.0019 -0.0075 0.2037 0.2532 -1.7864,   
1.0249 
-3.1823,    
2.5212 
The official release of ESTMA 
regulatory framework 
-0.0118 0.0082 0.1437 
 
0.4892 -.05733,   
0.5528 
 
-1.0436,   
8.1727 
ESTMA passes the first reading in 
parliament 
0.0001 -0.0169 0.1932 0.3435 -0.5909    
1.01652 
 
-3.2280,   
4.0639 
ESTMA passes final vote in parliament -0.0298 -0.0178 0.1663 0.2434 -0.6590,   
0.9169 
-2.1221,   
3.2748 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of CAR over the 3-day event window 
Event Median Standard dev Min, max 
 Oil & gas Mining Oil & gas Mining Oil & gas Mining 
Stephen Harper announces increased 
action against corruption 
 
-0.0025 -0.0018 0.1805 0.1630 -0.6075,   
1.8855 
-0.9160,   
1.6139 
The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
declaration 
 
-0.0055 -0.0122 0.1479 0.1885 -0.5049,  
1.0001 
-2.1009   
1.9076 
Official release of ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
0.0000 0.0025 0.0937 0.4589 -0.4774,    
0.5369 
 
-1.0204   
8.9863 
ESTMA passes first reading in 
parliament  
0.0032 -0.0188 0.1901 0.2942 -0.5114,   
1.0219 
-2.1309   
3.3732 
ESTMA passes final vote in parliament -0.0423 -0.0095 0.3357 0.1684 -1.1052,   
4.0000 
-0.9503   
1.1429 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics of CAR over 5-day event window.  
Event Median Standard dev Min, max 
 Oil & gas Mining Oil & gas Mining Oil & gas Mining 
Stephen Harper announces increased 
action against corruption 
 
0.0007 0.0011 0.2401 0.1978 -0.5027,   
2.7711 
 
-1.9801,   
1.6445 
 
The official signing of G8 Lough Ern 
declaration 
 
0.0004 0.0006 0.1578 0.2485 -0.50142,   
1.0003 
-0.9991,   
8.2019 
Official release of ESTMA regulatory 
framework 
0.0004 0.0073 0.1296 0.4867 -0.5576,   
0.5436 
 
-0.9991,   
8.2019 
ESTMA passes the first reading in 
parliament 
0.0024 0.0000 0.1712 0.3316 -0.3736,  
1.0008 
 
-3.0061,   
4.0657 
ESTMA passes the final vote in 
parliament 
-0.0008 0.0001 0.1615 0.2412 -0.5003,   
0.9988 
-1.9823,   
3.2556 
Note: Huber weighted regression used to estimate normal performance.  
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8.2. Appendix B. Distribution plots for cumulative abnormal returns   
 
 
Figure 2. Distributional plots: Cumulative Abnormal returns for Oil and gas producers. Events 1 - 5. 
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Figure 3. Distributional plots: Cumulative Abnormal returns for mining companies. Event 1 - 5. 
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8.3 Appendix C. Full list of considered events 
Table 11. Full list of considered events 
Event Date 
Stephen Harper announces increased action against 
corruption 
12 Jun 2013 
The official signing of G8 Lough Ern declaration 18 Jun 2013 
The official release of the ESTMA rules 16 Jan 2014 
The first reading of the bill containing ESTMA in 
parliament 
23 Oct 2014 
The bill containing ESTMA passes the final vote in 
parliament 
10 Dec 2014 
The bill containing ESTMA receives royal assent 16 Dec 2014 
Official implementation 1 June 2015  
